nous technology shocks (see, e.g., Prescott 1986). He argues that "under competition and constant returns to scale, the Solow residual is uncorrelated with all variables known to be neither causes of productivity shifts nor to be caused by productivity shifts" (p. 924). In fact, the Solow residual is significantly correlated with military expenditures (Hall 1988) , various monetary aggregates (Evans 1992) , and government consumption (see Sec. IV). Hall (1988 Hall ( , 1989 suggests that imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale are essential ingredients of an empirically plausible explanation of these types of correlations.
Not only is the Solow residual correlated with government consumption, but innovations to these two variables are also positively correlated (see Sec. IV). Suppose that analogously to Hall (1988 Hall ( , 1989 we take as given the identifying restriction that innovations to technology ought to be uncorrelated with innovations to government consumption. Then, two questions arise. First, how sensitive to this restriction are conventional measures of technology shocks and the performance of standard RBC models? Second, what are quantitatively convincing mechanisms to explain the observed correlation between the Solow residual and government consumption? This paper deals with these two questions.
To address the first question, we examine the effects of imposing orthogonality between innovations to technology (measured by innovations to the Solow residual) and government consumption within the Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) indivisible labor model. We find that imposing this restriction reduces the variance of the innovation to technology by roughly 60 percent and leads to a significant overall deterioration in the empirical performance of the model.
To address the second question, we construct and empirically implement a general equilibrium model that allows for labor hoarding behavior. By imposing the identifying restriction that innovations to true technology shocks are orthogonal to innovations to government consumption, we can estimate the fraction of the variability in the innovation to the Solow residual that is due to true technology shocks. Our model is able to account for the observed correlation between the Solow residual and government consumption as well as the observed correlation between the innovations to those variables. It also does as well as the standard model in accounting for the relative volatility of those economic aggregates typically stressed in RBC studies. This is true even though our identifying restrictions imply that the variance of innovations to technology is roughly 50 percent less than the variance implied by standard RBC models and that roughly 15 percent of the standard deviation of total labor input into market production is attributable to variations in labor effort. Depending on exactly which procedure we use to estimate the labor hoarding model, the fraction of output volatility accounted for by technology shocks drops between 30 and 60 percent relative to the standard model. ' The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe our basic model. Section III describes our econometric methodology. In Section IV we present our empirical results. Section V discusses some shortcomings of our analysis. Finally, Section VI contains some concluding remarks.
II. A Model of Time-varying Effort and the Business Cycle
In this section we present a variation of Hansen's (1985) 
The unconditional mean of ln(At) equals ln(A), I Pa I < 1, andeat is the innovation to ln(At) with a standard deviation of UEa' 1 The models in this paper allow for stochastic shocks in government consumption. While these shocks have a substantial impact on some properties of the model, we find that they have virtually no impact on the volatility of model output. This is consistent with results in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
The aggregate resource constraint is given by Ct + Kt+ I -(I-8) Kt + Gt '< Yt.
The parameter 8 represents the depreciation rate on capital (O < 8 < 1). The random variable Gt denotes time t government consumption, which evolves according to Gt=t 9t,
where g, has the law of motion ln(gt) = (1 -pg)ln(g) + pgln(gti,) + Egt.
Here ln(g) is the mean of ln(gt), I PgI < 1, and Egt is the innovation to ln(gt) with standard deviation (Teg*
In the presence of complete markets the decentralized competitive equilibrium corresponds to the solution of a social planning problem. Proceeding as in Rogerson (1988) , one can easily show that, since agents' criteria functions are separable across consumption and leisure, the social planner will equate the consumption of employed and unemployed individuals. Under these circumstances, the Paretooptimal competitive equilibrium corresponds to the solution of the following planning problem: maximize 
t=o subject to (3)-(7) and KO, by choice of contingency plans for {Ct, Kt+ 1, Nt, Wt: t ' 0}. In (8), we have normalized the number of agents in the economy to one. Also, Eo is the time 0 conditional expectations operator, and 13 is the subjective discount rate (O < 13 < 1). To complete the specification of the model we must specify the planner's time t information set, fW. If At and Gt are seen before Nt and Wt are chosen, then the model is observationally equivalent to the standard indivisible labor model, modified to incorporate government consumption into the analysis (see Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992 ). Here we suppose that Nt must be chosen before At and Gt are known. Let fit denote agents' common information set at the beginning of time t, which includes the lagged values of all variables in the model. Let fW consist of Qt plus (At, Gt). Then the planner's contingency plans for Nt will be a function of the elements of flt, and the contingency plans for Wt, Kt+1, and Ct will be functions of the elements of fl* 2
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The previous formalization of the planning problem incorporates the notion that firms must make employment decisions conditional on their views about the future state of demand and technology. Once employment decisions are made, firms adjust to observed shocks along other dimensions. In our model this adjustment occurs through variations in the labor effort that workers are asked to supply. Workers' compensation will depend on the effort supplied. However, to compute the laws of motion for the quantity variables, we do not have to be precise about the exact compensation scheme adopted by firms.
In the nonstochastic steady state of this economy, Yt, Kt, Ct, and Gt all grow at rate y; Wt and Nt are constants. Throughout this paper we use lowercase letters to denote detrended variables (e.g., yt = Yt/lyt). In general, it is not possible to solve this model analytically. Here we use King, Plosser, and Rebelo's (1988) log-linear modification of the procedure used by Kydland and Prescott (1982) to obtain an approximate solution to the planning problem. The resulting decision rules express {ln(Wt), ln(Nt), ln(kt?l), ln(ct)} as linear functions of ln(kt), ln(Nt), ln(At), and ln(gt).
We conclude this section by considering the implications of our model for the standard RBC practice of interpreting Solow residuals as exogenous technology shocks. Most RBC studies (see, e.g., Prescott 1986) assume that output is produced via the Cobb-Douglas production function:
Here Ht denotes total hours worked. Under the maintained assumptions of the standard indivisible labor model, Ht equals total individuals at work times the fixed shift length, f:
Ht =Ntf (10) Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that effort is constant over time. According to our model, the logarithm of the conventionally measured Solow residual, St, is related to the logarithms of the true technology shock, At, and effort, Wt, via the relationship ln(St) = ln(At) + aln(Wt).
It follows that objects that are correlated with ln(Wt) will also be correlated with ln(St), even though they are not correlated with ln(At). Since our model predicts that ln(Wt) depends on ln(gt), our model is consistent with the fact that the Solow residual is correlated with government consumption. Given our estimates of the model's structural parameters, it is opti-mal for agents to work harder in response to a positive innovation to government consumption. It follows from (11) that the Solow residual and average labor productivity will rise in response to such a shock. Naive Solow residual accounting falsely attributes the increase in average productivity to a shift in technology. It is also optimal for agents to work harder in response to a technology shock. Consequently, the Solow residual and average labor productivity will rise by more than a technology shock; that is, the innovation to ln(S,) will be larger than the corresponding innovation to ln(A,). We conclude that, according to our model, (i) effort is procyclical and (ii) naive Solow residual accounting systematically overestimates the level of technology in booms, systematically underestimates the level of technology in recessions, and systematically overestimates the variance of the true technology shock. In the next section we discuss our econometric method for studying the quantitative importance of this bias.
III. Econometric Method
The key problem in empirically implementing the model of Section II is that we do not have data on effort. In this paper, we adopt two strategies for dealing with this identification problem. Our first strategy, referred to as labor hoarding I, exploits functional form assumptions on the representative agent's utility function, as well as the assumption of perfect competition, to deduce a time series on effort that is a function of observable variables and a subset of the model parameters.
In the competitive equilibrium of our economy, effort is allocated so that the marginal product of an extra unit of effort times the marginal utility of an extra unit of consumption is equal to the marginal disutility of effort of those engaged in work, that is, Here ln(Y) and ln(g) denote the unconditional means of linearly detrended ln(Y,) and ln(Gt).5 The parameters yg and y denote the unconditional growth rates of government purchases and output, respectively. In describing our model, we assumed -y = yg.
The parameters T, P, f, and t were not estimated. Instead we fixed T at 1,369 hours per quarter. We set 13 equal to (1.03)-25. The parameter f was chosen so that the steady state of effort equals one. We experimented with a variety of values of e and found that our results were very insensitive to choices of e between 20 and 120. The results reported in Section IV correspond to a value of t equal to 60.
The Appendix formally describes our estimator of *I. When we restrict ourselves to an exactly identified GMM procedure, our estimator results in parameter estimates that have three appealing features. First, they are very similar to those used in most RBC studies. This allows us to isolate the effects of labor hoarding per se in those models. Second, the model succeeds in reproducing the first moments of the data. Third, our estimator can be given a very simple interpretation. In particular, our estimator of 8 corresponds to the average rate of depreciation in the empirical capital stock and investment series. The estimators of a and 0 are designed to make the model reproduce the sample average value of the capital/output ratio and hours worked. The point estimates of Pa and u, are obtained by running ordinary least squares on an AR(1) specification of the natural log of our measure of technology shocks. Our point estimates of ln(-y) and ln(Y) are obtained by regressing the natural log of our measure of output on a constant and time. We estimate ln(g) and ln(yg) by regressing the natural log of our measure of government consumption on a constant and time. Finally, our point estimates of pg and a, are obtained by applying ordinary least squares to ln(Gt/Iy).
This estimator of *I does not guarantee that innovations to technology shocks will be orthogonal to innovations to government purchases; that is, our exactly identified estimator does not impose the condition
While we can test whether this condition is satisfied using the Waldtype statistic (j) discussed above, condition (16) can also be imposed during the estimation procedure. When this is done, the GMM system has one overidentifying restriction, which can be tested using Hansen's (1982)J statistic.6
In order to compare our model to a standard RBC model, we also estimate the structural parameters of the Hansen ( To implement our diagnostic procedures, we must estimate various moments of the data-generating process. The vector 12 denotes the set of second moments to be estimated. For some of the tests we conduct, 12 is specified as
Here APL denotes the average productivity of labor, i denotes gross investment, and a. denotes the standard deviation of the variable x, x = {c, y, APL, i, h}. This specification of I2 is useful for considering the implications of our model for the moments of the data typically stressed in existing RBC studies. Since the data display marked time trends, some stationary inducing transformation must be adopted to ensure that the moments in (17) 
Here bg refers to the regression coefficient of the growth rate of the Solow residual on the growth rate of government consumption, and b(E,, Eg) denotes the regression coefficient of the innovation to the Solow residual on the innovation to government consumption.
Irrespective of the precise specification of 12, any estimator of 1I and 12 will be based on the same data set. Moreover, the Solow residual involves the unknown parameter a (which is an element of 11). These facts imply the existence of a nonzero covariance between estimators of 1I and 12. Consequently, we estimate 1I and 12 simultaneously in order to obtain the correct sampling distribution for our estimator (see the Appendix).
The parameters 0 and 0 are related according to 0 = 0 ln[TI(T -e -f)].
B. Data
Private consumption, Ct, was measured as the sum of private-sector expenditures on nondurable goods plus services plus the imputed service flow from the stock of durable goods. Government consumption, Gt, was measured by real government purchases of goods and services minus real government (federal, state, and local) investment. The capital stock, Kt, was measured as the sum of consumer durables, producer structures and equipment, and government and private residential capital plus government nonresidential capital. Data on gross investment, It, are the flow data that match the capital stock concept. Gross output, Yt, was measured as Ct plus Gt plus It plus time t inventory investment. Our basic measure of hours worked is the one constructed by Hansen (1984) , which we refer to as household hours. The data are quarterly, cover the period 1959: 1-1984: 1, and were converted to per capita terms using an efficiency-weighted measure of the population.8 Finally, we incorporate Prescott's (1986) model of measurement error into our analysis. In particular, we assume that the log of reported hours worked differs from the log of actual hours worked by an independently and identically distributed random variable that has mean zero and standard errors (n. To estimate av we exploit two different measures of hours worked. The first is Hansen's (1984) measure, which is based on the household survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census. The second is based on the establishment survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (see the Appendix for details regarding the estimation procedure).
IV. Empirical Results
In this section we report our empirical results. We begin by discussing the Hansen-Rogerson model. Here we focus on three key results. First, this model is inconsistent with the observed correlation between the growth rate of government purchases and the Solow residual. Second, innovations to the measure of technology shocks used in RBC models (the Solow residual) display a positive, statistically significant correlation with innovations to government purchases. Third, when we impose the condition that these innovations ought to be orthogonal, the point estimates of the model's parameters move to inadmissible values.
After discussing the Hansen-Rogerson model, we consider the empirical implications of our labor hoarding model. Our main results here can be summarized as follows. First, the model is consistent with the observed correlation between the growth rates of government consumption and the Solow residual. Second, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that innovations to the measure of technology shocks that emerge from the model are orthogonal to innovations to government consumption. Third, these technology shocks are much less volatile than innovations to the Solow residual. This translates into a marked reduction in the percentage of output volatility that can be attributed to technology shocks. Fourth, the labor hoarding model does at least as well as the Hansen-Rogerson model at accounting for the volatility of hours worked and the relative volatility of consumption, investment, average productivity, and government consumption. Table 1 equals zero can be rejected at less than the 1 percent significance level. The only way to reconcile this finding with the notion that the Solow residual measures exogenous technology shocks is to suppose that government consumption responds to such shocks within the quarter. This would violate one of the basic identifying assumptions of this paper. Second, the regression coefficient of the growth rate of government consumption on the growth rate of the Solow residual is positive (.176) and statistically significant. The null hypothesis that bg actually equals zero can be rejected at less than the 1 percent significance level. This finding mirrors Hall's (1988) result that the growth rate in his measure of government spending is significantly correlated with the growth rate of the Solow residual.
Column 2 of table 1 reports parameter estimates for the HansenRogerson model when overidentifying restriction (16) is imposed during the estimation procedure. The last entry in this column is Hansen's J statistic, which we use to test the overidentified system. The number in parentheses denotes the corresponding probability value. Notice that the overidentified system is rejected at less than the 1 percent significance level. This provides confirming evidence that the measure of technology shocks used in standard RBC models is inconsistent with restriction (16). Also notice that when (16) is imposed, the estimated value of Pa exceeds one. Evidently, the model cannot accommodate this restriction with an admissible value of Pa. This provides strong additional evidence regarding the incompatibility of the model with restriction (16)." Columns 3-6 of table 1 present our parameter estimates for the unconstrained and constrained labor hoarding I and labor hoarding II cases. By constrained we mean that condition (16) is imposed during estimation. In principle the estimated labor hoarding model allows us to disentangle actual technology shocks from movements in the Solow residual. The key issue is why one should take this model more seriously than standard versions of the RBC model. We have already established that innovations to the Solow residual are not orthogonal to innovations to government consumption. Moreover, we showed that the growth rates of government consumption and the Solow residual are positively correlated. Neither finding can be accounted for by the standard model. We now show that both findings can be accounted for by the labor hoarding model. Moreover, one cannot reject the hypothesis that innovations to the time series on technology shocks generated by the estimated labor hoarding model are orthogonal to innovations to government purchases.
According to the labor hoarding model, the correlation between innovations to technology shocks and those to government consumption, b(Eaq Eg), ought to equal zero (see col. 4 or 6 of table 2). Our exactly identified GMM estimation procedure does not impose this restriction, for either of the two identification strategies pursued. However, given our point estimates of the structural parameters, we can compute the implied value for b(Eaq Eg). This value is reported in columns 3 and 5 of table 2. Numbers in parentheses denote standard errors.12 Numbers in brackets denote the probability values of our statistic for testing whether b(Ea, Eg) equals zero in population. Notice that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that b(Eaq Eg) is equal to zero at the 3 percent and 22 percent significance levels, for the labor hoarding I and labor hoarding II cases, respectively. These results " Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1991) redo the empirical analysis in this paper allowing for a break in the sample at 1969:4. The resulting point estimates of Pa are always less than one. This finding aside, the main conclusions of this paper are very robust to splitting the sample. They find that imposing (16) (i) reduces the estimated variance of innovations to technology shocks by approximately 33 percent and 61 percent in the first and second sample periods, respectively; (ii) reduces the unconditional volatility of technology shocks by 31 percent and 25 percent in the first and second sample periods, respectively; and (iii) reduces the percentage of the variance of output that the model can account for by 33 percent and 68 percent in the first and second sample periods, respectively. 12 These standard errors reflect the sampling uncertainty in our point estimates of the model's parameters.
are consistent with the tests of the overidentified GMM systems in which (16) is imposed (see table 1).'3
This result would not be very interesting if the labor hoarding model accommodated (16) at the cost of generating counterfactual implications for b(E,, Eg) or bg. This is not the case. Table 2 indicates that (i) irrespective of which identification strategy is used, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the values of b(E,, Eg) implied by our parameter estimates and the non-model-based estimates are equal in population; and (ii) the labor hoarding model can account for the observed correlation between the growth rates of the Solow residual and government consumption. The value of bg implied by both labor hoarding I and IL equals .107 with a standard error of .025. The estimated value of bg in the data equals .176 with a standard error of .07. Testing the hypothesis that the two regression coefficients are the same in population, we obtain a value for the x2 statistic that has a probability value of .38. Consequently, one cannot reject, at conventional significance levels, the view that our model fully succeeds in accounting for the regression coefficient in question.
Hall ( Notice that the values of A obtained under the two identification schemes are quite similar and decline when (16) is imposed. In all cases the log of effort accounts for less than a fifth of the standard deviation of the log of total effective labor input. Evidently one can account for Hall's results and the positive correlation between innovations to the Solow residual and government consumption without assuming that most of the movement in total effective labor input is due to variations in effort. Consider now the performance of the two models with respect to the volatility of hours worked, Cah, the relative volatility of consumption, investment, and government purchases to output-o>/cry, ailcy, and trg/Oy, respectively-and the volatility of hours worked relative to average productivity, trh/cAPL. Table 3 reports the models' predictions for these moments as well as our estimates of the corresponding data moments. Each element in this table contains three numbers. The top number equals the value of the moment implied by the relevant model. The middle number (in parentheses) is the estimated standard error of the first number. For each moment we tested the null hypothesis that the model moment equals the data population moment. The bottom number (in brackets) equals the probability value of theJ statistic. Table 3 reveals that it is very difficult to distinguish between the models on the basis of their implications for the moments in question. Indeed, there is very little evidence against the individual hypotheses that the value of 0h', ,/Ory, oIa/ay, Og/Oay, or O~h/OrAPL that emerges from any of the models is different from the corresponding data population moment. We conclude that allowing for time-varying effort does not cause the model's performance to deteriorate with respect to these moments. Burnside et al. (1991) argue that the labor hoarding model is better able to account for the joint behavior of average productivity and hours worked than the standard model.'4 14 In particular, the labor hoarding model is consistent with three key facts. First, average productivity and hours worked do not display any marked contemporaneous correlation. Second, average productivity leads the cycle in the sense that it is positively correlated with future hours worked. Third, average productivity is negatively correlated with lagged hours. Gordon (1979) presents evidence on this last phenomenon, which he refers to as the "End-of-Expansion-Productivity-Slowdown." McCallum (1989) documents a similar pattern for the dynamic correlation between average productivity and output. We now turn to the question of how inference about the volatility of technology shocks is affected by allowing for labor hoarding. Table  4 
V. Shortcomings of the Analysis
According to our labor hoarding model, firms can contemporaneously adjust to unanticipated changes in demand and productivity only by using labor more intensively. In reality there are a variety of margins along which firms can adjust. In this section we briefly discuss three such margins and indicate the nature of the biases that they are likely to impart on our results.
A. Endogenous Capital Utilization Rates
Our model does not allow for endogenous capital utilization rates. Allowing for them would strengthen our main conclusions. While poorly measured, capital utilization rates are clearly procyclical (Shapiro 1989). Consequently, the measurement error involved in using the stock of capital to calculate the Solow residual would also be procyclical. The same sorts of impulses that cause labor effort to increase would presumably also induce increases in capital utilization rates. To the extent that this is true, our results understate the sensitivity of RBC models to more general types of "hoarding" behavior. , where ln(Xt) = ln(n't + n't) -al ln(n1t + n2t)* Consider a shock that generates an increase in the equilibrium levels of n1t and n2t. It is straightforward to show that ln(Xt) will increase provided that two plausible conditions are satisfied: (i) n1t > n2t, that is, total straight-time hours exceed total overtime hours; and (ii) the elasticity of n2t with respect to this shock exceeds that of n1t. Sargent (1987) produces an example in which condition ii is satisfied because of differential costs of adjustment in n1t and n2t. This has three important implications.
First, Solow residual accounting overstates the volatility of the technology shocks to the extent that n1t and n2t are not perfect substitutes."6 Second, average productivity can in principle be procyclical even in the absence of any technology shocks and in the presence of constant returns to scale production functions. Third, the previous example suggests a way of seeing whether the straight time/overtime distinction can explain the fact that the growth rate of the Solow residual is correlated with the growth rate of government consumption. According to the previous example, the "correct" Solow residual is given by ln(Yt) -(1 -oL)ln(Kt) -ln(n', + n't). We calculated a time series on this residual using the measures of straight-time and overtime hours adopted by Hansen and Sargent (1988, p. 291) , using values of oa ranging from .55 to .75. In every instance, the regression coefficient of the growth rate in the "correct" Solow residual on the growth rate in government consumption exceeded .13 and was statistically significant. In contrast, the value of this regression coefficient using conventionally measured Solow residuals is approximately .18 (see table 2). So, while the regression coefficient becomes somewhat smaller when we correct for cyclical changes in the straight time/ overtime labor mix, this route does not appear, in and of itself, capable of resolving the basic problem.
One of the main points of this paper was that the volatility of output that is attributable to technology shocks has been overstated by existing RBC studies. Since we proceeded under the standard assumption that straight time and overtime are perfect substitutes when calculating the Solow residual, the importance of technology shocks in explaining output volatility is likely to be even smaller than our analysis indicates.
A second major purpose of our paper was to explore the role of labor hoarding in the business cycle. By ignoring the distinction between straight time and overtime in our model, we are likely to overstate the role of labor hoarding. In fact there is a trivial reinterpretation of our model in which time t effort, Wt, represents overtime labor. Under this reinterpretation, the firm cannot change the number of people hired at time t following an innovation to At or Gt, but it could increase overtime labor, that is, shift length. There is nothing in our model that prevents such a reinterpretation. However, assuming that straight-time and overtime labor are perfect substitutes would lead us back to where we started from. Labor input would be correctly measured and innovations to the Solow residual would accurately measure innovations to technology. But then one could not explain the observed correlation between innovations to the Solow residual and innovations to government purchases without violating our basic identifying restriction, namely, that innovations to technology ought to be orthogonal to innovations to government consumption.
C. Contemporaneous Adjustments in Employment
Our model assumes that firms cannot adjust the total number of people hired in response to unanticipated shocks in technology or government purchases. To the extent that this assumption is incorrect, our results will overstate the importance of labor hoarding and understate the importance of technology shocks.
To explore some of the ramifications of allowing firms some flexibility in changing employment after seeing the time t realizations of At and Gt, we nest the Hansen-Rogerson model and our labor hoarding model within a more general setup. Suppose that the representative consumer's preferences and technology are the same as described in Section II with the following modification: firms must make an initial time t employment plan on the basis of the information set fit which does not include the time t innovations to At and Gt. Denote the value of planned time t employment by N>*. In contrast to the model of Section II, suppose that after the innovations to At and Gt are realized, the firm can revise and set actual employment to N. However, there is an adjustment cost, (1i/2)(Nt -Nt*)2, associated with deviations of actual employment from planned employment. The model of Section II corresponds to the case of 1i = oc, in which case Nt will always equal planned employment N*. The Hansen-Rogerson model corresponds to the case of 1i = 0 so that N* is irrelevant. is asymptotically distributed as a x2 random variable with q degrees of freedom.
We now show how the unconditional moment restrictions implied by the labor hoarding model must be modified to take account of measurement error in hours worked. Proceeding as in Prescott (1986), we assume that the two measures of hours worked at our disposal are related to true hours in the following way: The equations used to identify 0 need not be modified to take account of measurement error, since the terms involving measurement error in the first-order Taylor series expansions have mean zero. For the HansenRogerson model, the same modifications to (A9) and (A10) used in labor hoarding II are used again, except that ax is substituted for + wherever it appears.
